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~N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS R. BROADBENT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12263 
This is an action by plaintiff doctor for indemnity 
from his alleged professional liability insurance carrier 
a:s the result of a settlement of a malpractice claim 
against the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment and entered 
judgment thereon in favor of the defendant, no cause 
of action, on the ground that as a matter of law, plain-
tiff had failed to comply with the notice provisions of 
his policy. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the judgment 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in appellant's brief 
is incomplete, and we, therefore, deem it necessary to 
restate the facts. 
Plaintiff asserts that defendant afforded pro.fos-
sional liability insurance coverage to him during the 
period May 1954 and for a period of two years there-
after. The policy allegedly issued by defendant contained 
the following provision: 
"2. Notice of Injury, Claim or Suit. 
Upon the insured becoming aware of any alleged 
injury covered hereby, written notice shall be 
given by or on behalf of the Insured to the Com-
pany or any of its authorized agents as soon as 
practicable, together with the fullest information 
obtainable .... " (Emphasis ours.) (R. 7) 
The same policy also provided: 
"No action shall lie against the company unless, 
as a condition precedent thereto, the Insured 
shall have fully complied with all the terms of 
this policy .... " 
It may be noted here that defendant doe:S not admit 
the issuance of the purported policy. However, for pur-
poses of this appeal, it may be considered by the court 
that such a policy was in fact issued. 
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On June 30, 1954, defendant implanted radon seeds 
into the mouth of Adrienne Gyr. (Plaintiff's deposition, 
page 14). These contained radio-active material, the 
effect of which was almost completely spent within a 
period of about thirty days. (Plaintiff's deposition, page 
12). Even before the thirty day period expired, plain-
tiff experienced effects of a greater degree than had 
been anticipated. On July 16, 1954, she was noted to 
have "severe salivation and mucositis" and "more reac-
tion" than had really been expected. (Plaintiff's deposi-
tion, pages 13, 14). 
A copy of plaintiff's office chart relative to Miss 
Gyr is attached to his deposition. It reveals that on 
July 21, 1954, he was sufficiently concerned to have 
x-rays taken to calculate the gamma roentgens. (See 
also plaintiff's deposition, page 62). At the same time, 
plaintiff also checked with the radium company which 
had furnished the radon seeds, for the purpose of check-
ing the dosage. (Plaintiff's deposition, pages 62 and 63). 
Both of these checks were "initiated by reason of the 
greater than anticipated response." (Plaintiff's deposi-
tion, page 63). 
The doctor's office chart reflects that plaintiff fol-
lowed a steady downhill course. On practically every 
office visit, new findings are noted or old ones are noted 
to be aggravated. 
His office record of July 25, 1954, describes the area 
of the cheek as, "a little less frightening." On August 3, 
1954 the inside of the mouth is described as, "seems to 
' 
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be worse." On September 13, 1954, she was noted to 
develop edema of her feet and to look a little anemic. 
On September 271 1954, she was noted to continue to 
have considerable discomfort in the tongue. This was 
again noted on November 8, 1954. On November 22, 
1954, she had contamination in the mouth and a little 
lymphangitis. On January 5, 1955, she was beginning to 
have some toothache and some retraction of the gums. 
By February of 1955, plaintiff was definitely concerned 
about her response to therapy. (Plaintiff's deposition, 
page 22). 
Office notes of May 3, 1955, indicate that she had 
areas of erosion, with bone exposure. This was not 
anticipated and increased plaintiff's concern for his pa-
tient. (Plaintiff's deposition, page 23). 
On January 3, 1956, it was noted that she, might 
lose a tooth and a piece of bone in the jaw. By June 7, 
1956, it was decided to refer her to Dr. Robinson, a 
plastic surgeon, for consultation. Office notes of July 
27, 1956, indicate that it was explained to her that in 
the future, she would probably lose some bone, and 
this warning was repeated on August 28, 1956. 
On January 11, 1957, plaintiff became aware for the 
first time that his patient had had prior radium treat-
ment. At that time, she was told that she would prob-
ably lose some teeth and part of the mandible. The 
doctor commented in his notes that it was likely, "that 
she now has a cumulative' dose of the radon plus the 
radium giving her this problem" and "also, that a second 
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factor might well be that there was not as much tumor 
tissue as thought when calculated for the average and 
minimal dose." (Emphasis ours.) Dr. Broadbent was 
then concerned about what the previous treatment might 
mean in her course. (Plaintiff's deposition, page 32). 
No later than this date, plaintiff was aware both that 
his patient had sustained adverse effects far beyond 
anything that had been anticipated, ("injury") and that 
he might have miscalculated the dosage, and that this 
might be a factor in her condition. ("Malpractice," 
"errors" or "mistakes") 
On May 31, 1957, plaintiff consulted with his p~ 
tient and her father. His notes reflect that he advised 
them "that there was possibly some over-treatment" and 
that there had "been an over-effect with scme untoward 
results." 
Notwithstanding the patient's continued downhill 
course, progressive increase in problems and his final 
conclusion that he may have -Over-treated her, or that 
her condition may have been complicated by reason of 
previous radium therapy, Dr. Broadbent never notified 
defendant of the possible claim until approximately 
June 1967, about the time he received a demand letter 
from his patient's attorney, and only a few weeks before 
suit was filed against him on her behalf. (Deposition, 
page 49). 
Plaintiff was not unaware of the requirement or 
importance of giving notice to his liability carrier. In 
another instance where plaintiff had a patient who was 
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unhappy with the result of his treatment, he gave notice 
to his professional liability carrier because, "there was 
at least a possibility that the patient might make a 
claim against him." This occurred in the early 1960s. 
(Plaintiff's deposition, pages 9 and 10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE NO-
TICE PROVISIONS OF HIS PURPORTED POLICY 
OF INSURANCE. 
Under the terms of the policy allegedly issued to 
plaintiff, he was required to give notice "as soon as 
practicable" to his liability insurance carrier upon "be-
coming aware of any alleged injury" covered by his 
policy. Counsel for the plaintiff apparently takes the 
position that plaintiff was the sole judge, both of whether 
he had committed any malpractice, mistake or error, 
and also whether there would probably be a claim arising 
therefrom. A similar contention was made by the insured 
in the case of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany vs. Lloyd, 137 F.Supp. 7. In disposing of that 
argument the court said: 
"He [insured] seeks here to require his insurer 
to defend what he claims to be a wholly unfounded 
action, and at the same time justifies his failure 
to notify his insurer on the ground that, in his 
opinion, any action against him would be without 
merit. He may not on the one hand require 
the defense provided for in the policy for an 
unfounded aetion and, at the same time, refuse 
to notify his insurance company on the ground 
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that it was unfounded. If the company is required 
to def end an unfounded action - which it is -
it is equally entitled to the notice required in 
the policy regardless of its insured's own personal 
notions of what his legal liability was." 
We agree wholeheartedly with the reasons for the 
notice provision as set forth in the quotation from 
8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Section 4731, 
as quoted in appellant's brief, pages 5 and 6. Other 
authorities to the same effect are: 13 Couch on Insur-
ance 2d, pages 634 and 635, Section 49 :2, and page 659, 
Section 49 :37; 18 ALR2d 443, at 447 and 451; Oregon 
Farm Bureau Insurance Company vs. Safeco Insurance 
Company of America, (Ore.), 438 P.2d 1018; Arthur v. 
London Guarantee&; Accident Company, (Cal.App.), 177 
P.2d 625. 
What is notice as soon as practicable depends upon 
the facts of each particular case. There are innumerable 
cases in the annotation in 18 ALR 2d, cited and relied 
upon by plaintiff, wherein notices ranging from approxi-
mately 70 days up to three and one-half years have been 
held as a matter of law to be late and a breach of the 
notice provisions of the policy. We cite as illustrative, 
but by no means exhaustive: Certified Indemnity Com-
pany vs. Thun, (Col.), 439 P.2d 28 (73 days); Johnson 
vs. Universal Underwriters, (7th Cir.), 283 F.2d 316 
(74 days); Coolidge v. Standard Accident Insurance 
Compatny, (Cal.App.), 300 P. 885 (three and one-half 
months); Bitrbank v. National Casualty Company, (Cal. 
App.), 59 P.2d 589 (91 days); Hartford Accident & 
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I 7_3 
Indemnity Company rs. Lloycl, l-37 F.Supp. 7 (8 months); 
Oregon Farm Bureau Insurance Company i·s. Safr;co 
Insurance Company of America, (Ore.), 43'3 P.2d 1018 
(hrn years); Hartford Accident a11d Indemnity Company 
1.:s. Lochmandy Buick Sales, Inc., (Ith Cir.); 302 F.2d 
565 (two years); Boyer i·s. American Casualty C0mpw1y, 
(2nd Cir.), 332 F.2d 709 (h,-o years); a.nd P1iref0y i-. 
Pacific Automobile Indemnity Exchange, (Cal.), 53 P.2d 
155 (Three and one-half years). 
Our research has disclosed only three casi:-s innJh--
ing the problem of late notice in a professiona~ lial-Jility 
insurance policy. The first of these in S0h;;z L".S. C.S.F. 
cf G. Company, (6th Cir.)~ 352 F.2d G5. Thi". casi:- is 
cited in appellant's brief at page ten. le. that cas ... the 
doctor performed an operation in ...ll:gust of HH):.2. He 
obser\ed a second. operation per:formi:-d C•n Lis r·ati.,nt 
in October of 1%2. _.\..t that time. he b.:-carn.:. a,»-ar.:. and 
admitted that he had placed a snn.ue in t~ci:, r·a~.:.nfs 
femoral ne1Te and thus canse-<l injury ,,f -wLr:·~~ :~~.:. pa-
tient complained. Howe•er. he did nc•t n 1: 1:i:::·; 1' s ~ns·_uer 
until ~farrh 11, 19t13. t\\O cays ai!t-r f"-i:'t-~~:C::' W•tice 
from his patient's ath1rney. It "as 1-:.t-~.J. as a ~~::i.::~r of 
law that he did nl't gi,-e n(1tict- as s1:":'n as ~-:·;:;..:-~"::.ble 
and that the insurer "-as Ill't li<1 b~t- :> :· :~~'°" <:...:.::.~-: ·:::i: of 
tht' rt'l'l1,·e>ry a~ainst hin1.. ~:1ill. :l:.:- l'•Y_::-.:: 
"In the prest>nt l·a.se. al:b.c,::.::"'.:.. ~1::-s. \\~s-:·:: com-
plained l1t' pau1 TL) t!;.e a~'!-'"'~~z: :.'._:_,:. -:L:y ::.J-:•;\ing 
th ' t': r 't 1l't'l°'1 r; 1 r l'Il \. ,. ~· -.- · ,-. • .,..,,:_.· :-:..:c.-i L'·)Il-
• ~ --.l ~ '- -1.. "':.,~----~: l~ _: - .. ~~ .... ~ .. -'"--~ .. -~:-: ~--~_-:.·.:.. .. --:...:..~ 1:2 
tlllUl"-1 tl) l'l1 tl~~·L<-L l1 - :··~·-· "_ ..... •· -::: - --··- -- • 
1~)t>:.:. 1h' :1.l<,•:: ,,:::::. ::-:.~--'~ ·-- ... ___ ::.::.~: -- =~·:-::.r: 
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the appellee. At this point it might be under-
standable that some doubt would exist in the 
appellant's mind as to the cause of injury. 
However, this doubt was, or should nave been, 
completely removed on October 1, 1962, when 
appellant observed the second operation by Dr. 
Saunders, readily admitted that he placed the 
suture through the edge of the femoral nerve, 
and this caused the injury of which Mrs. Wilson 
complained. Further, 'appellant admits he knew 
Mrs. Wilson had a right to bring a lawsuit against 
him. No action was taken by appellant to give 
notice to the appellee until March 11, 1963, two 
days after receiving a letter from Mrs. Wilson's 
attorney. The court is unable to find any circum-
stances beyond the control of appellant which 
would excuse appellant from giving the required 
notice 'as soon as practicable.' 
* * * 
"As stiated previously, the court is of the opinion 
that when the appellant knew on October 1, 1962, 
that he caused the injury of which Mrs. Wilson 
complained, amd at that time also knew she had 
a right to bring a lawsuit, he was aware of an 
alleged injury covered under his liability policy. 
This provision does not mean that the appellarnt 
could wait until he was sued. 
"It is the finding of the court that the delay on 
the part of the appellant, in absence of circum-
stances beyond his control, in complying with the 
terms of the policy to furnish written notice to 
the appellee 'as soon as practicable' was a breach 
of the policy provisions requiring such written 
notice to be furnished .... " (Emphasis ours.) 
The second case is Bergh 1·s. Canadian enfrersal 
Insurancr: Compa11y, (Fla.App.), 197 So.2d 847. In that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
case, the doctor performed a surgical procedure on his 
patient in January 1964, which was followed by compli-
cations. A second procedure was done in June of 1964, 
also followed by substantial complications. On October 
26, 1964, the patient's attorney wrote the doctor a de-
mand letter. However, the doctor did not report the in-
cident tb his insurance company until April 1, 1965, after 
suit had been commenced. Said the court: 
"Failure to give notice as soon as practicable has 
been held to be a material breach of an insur-
ance policy in this state in numerous reported 
cases .... 
"In the case at bar, the claim as to which insur-
ance coverage is contested involves alleged medi-
cal malpractice. The patient contends that she 
had su,ffered substantial damages, the severity 
of which dictated the need for early and thoroitgh 
investigation concerning the cause and extent 
thereof. Under the circumstances appearing in 
this case, the appellant has not made it appear 
that the able trial judge erroneously held that the 
insured had not given notice of the accident as 
soon as practicable in conformance with the policy 
requirements." (Emphasis ours.) 
The third case is Falk vs. Sitl America Terrestres 
Maritimos E. Accidentes Companhi.a De Seguros, (Ore.), 
465 P.2d 714. In that case, the doctor learned of the 
apparent existence of an injury and of the potential 
existence of a claim some two years before a malpractice 
action was filed against him. However, he did not re-
port the matter to his insurance carrier until after snit 
was filed. The trial court held that he had sufficient 
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knowledge to cause him to believe that a potential claim 
existed and which required that he notify his insurer of 
the facts of which he was aware, and that he breached 
the notice provision of his policy. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment of the court below. 
In no case cited by the plaintiff has a delay of 
notice of more than about three years been held to 
comply with the policy requirement of a notice "as soon 
as practicable" or equivalent language. It appears to 
us that earlier decisions of this court are fully deter-
minative of the issues here and compel an affirrnance 
of the judgment below. 
In Amundson vs. Mutual Benefit Health and Acci-
dent Association, 13 Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463, defend-
ant's policy required notice to be given as soon as reason-
ably possible. Notice was not given until after a lapse 
of 32 years. This court there adopted the six year statute 
of limitations on actions on written instruments as the 
very maximum limit of time that could be held to comply 
with a policy provision requiring notice as soon as 
reasonably possible. This court there said: 
" ... In this case the insurer pleads inability to 
determine even the fact whether it issued the 
policy under which plainti.ff makes her claim. In 
addition witnesses may have died, memories have 
faded a~d the claim has grown stale indeed. The 
extended lapse of time has materially increased 
the risk of the insurer to a degree clearly not 
contemplated by the provision for notice and 
proof of loss as soon as 'reasonably possible.' ... 
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"To favor certainty rather than uncertainty in 
the determination of the period of time after 
which prejudice to the insur<:>r demands the claim 
be barred, and in view of the fact the legislature 
has seen fit to bar claims based npon written 
contract after six years has elapsed, we shall 
adopt this period, and hold that as applied to 
this particidar policy, proof of loss should have 
been filed within six years after the loss . ... " 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Although the policy in question requires notice "as soein 
as practicable," rather than "as soon as reasonably pos-
sible," the meaning of the two phrases is essentially 
the same, and the same result should follow. 
See also Dunn vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, (Utah), 110 P.2d 561, where a policy required 
notice within twenty days and a notice given after six 
months was held as a matter of law to be a failure of 
compliance and to bar recovery on the policy. 
In Anderson vs. Beneficial Fire and Casitalty Com-
pany, 21 Utah 2d 173, 442 P.2d 933, this court inferred 
by way of dictum that failure. to give a written notice 
within sixty days as required by the policy would be 
justification for the insurer to deny coverage. 
POINT II 
LATE NOTICE IS NOT EXCUSED. 
A. THIS WAS NOT A TRIVIAL OCCURRENCE. 
Plaintiff seeks to justify his belated notice under 
the doctrine of trivial occurrence·, as illustrated in the 
case of Joh11son Beady- Mix Concrete Company vs. 
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United Pacific Insurance Company, 11 U.2d 279, 358 
P.2d 337. The doctrine of that case has no application 
here. That involved an incident where, at the time of 
the accident, the injury to the claimant was apparently 
trivial in nature, and not the type of thing likely to 
give rise to a claim or suit. The facts of this case are 
not of that category. From the outset, the patient exper-
ienced problems far in excess of those anticipated. By 
January of 1957, it was clear to plaintiff that his patient 
was going to lose all or a part of her mandible and 
many of her teeth. She also required extensive dental 
care. It would take a callous individual indeed to say 
that the loss of a jawbone to a female patient is a trivial 
occurrence. As said in Century Indemnity Company vs. 
Serafine, 311 F.2d 676, at 680: 
"It was Mr. Serafine's duty to report to Century 
any occurrence which a reasonably prudent man 
would have had reason to believe was covered by 
the provisions of the policy and upon which a 
claim could reasonably be urged. Hoffman & 
Klemperer Co. v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee 
Corporation Ltd., 7 Cir., 1961, 292 F.2d 324; 
Cf. Hartford Accident & Indemnit.v Co. v. Loch-
mandy Buick Sales, Inc., 7 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 
565 .... " 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF TRIVIAL OCCURRENCE 
COULD NOT IN ANY EVENT EXTEND THE NOTICE TIME 
BEYOND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS ON AN ACTION 
FOR WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
It does not appear to us that there is any conflict 
between the holdings of this court in Johnson Ready-Mix 
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Concrete Conipany v. United Pacific Insurance Com-
pany, supra, and Amundson vs. Mutual Benefit Health 
and Accident Association, supra. In the latter case, this 
court circumscribed the limits beyond which notice could 
not go, that is the period of limitations for action on a 
written contract, which is six years. No later than Janu-
ary 1957, plaintiff was aware that his patient was in 
serious difficulty, would certainly sustain a serious loss, 
and that it might very well have resulted from his mis-
calculation of the dosage. At the very latest, notice 
should have been given to his liability carrier at that 
time. In fact, notice was def erred more than ten years 
thereafter and not given until June 1967, after an attor-
ney had intervened. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO ESTABLISH 
PREJUDICE TO ITSELF BY REASON OF LATE 
NOTICE. 
While there are cases that support plaintiff's con-
tention that an insurer must show prejudice in order 
to def eat recovery on the grounds of late notice, the 
great weight of authority and the better reasoned de-
cisions hold to the contrary. Particularly is this true 
where, as here, the provisions of the policy make com-
pliance with the notice requirement a condition precedent 
to suit on the policy. 
One of the leading and most oft quoted cases on this 
subject is State Farm Miitual Automobile Insurance 
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Company vs. Cassinelli, (Nev.), 216 P.2d 606, 18 ALR2d 
431. The Nevada court there said: 
"We may say frankly that upon our first reading 
of the briefs prior to argnment and at the con-
clusion of the argnment, we were strongly im-
pressed with the cases presented to the effect 
that right of recovery under the policy would not 
be barred by failure to give timely notice, unless 
the insurer had been prejudiced by such failure. 
The arguments in favor of such rule seemed 
plausible and the rule itself appeared neither 
unfair nor inequitable, especially if it were coupled 
with the rule adopted in some jurisdictions that 
prejudice would be presumed and that burden 
of proof be upon the insured to overcome such 
presumption by a proper showing. As we have 
seen however, a careful consideration of the cases 
shows that in no case so holding did the policy 
contain a clause to the effect that the compliance 
with the requirements for notice was a condition 
precedent to recovery. It would be presumptuous 
on our part to establish a rule of law in this state 
which departs from the overwhelming majority of 
decisions throughout the United States." 
The court also quoted from 76 ALR 183 as follows: 
" 'In insurance of this character it is a matter of 
the first importance to the insurer, who may be 
forced to become the real defendant in a law 
suit against the insured, ... to be speedily in-
formed of all the facts and witnesses concerning 
a possible litigation. In a very little time the 
facts may in a great measure fade out of memory, 
or become distorted, witnesses may go beyond 
reach, physical conditions may change, and, more 
dangerous than all, frand and cupidity may havP 
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fore, this stipulation is vital to the contract.'" 
Following the report of that case in 18 ALR 2d is an 
annotation commencing 1at page 443. At page 449 of the 
annotation, it is said: 
" ... Gt~nerally speaking it has been held that an 
insurer need not show that its rights had been 
prejudiced by the insured's delay in giving notice 
or in forwarding the suit papers where the liabil-
ity policy made the requirement as to notice aJld 
forwarding suit papers expressly a condition 
precedent to any liability on the part of the 
insurer." 
and at page 452 of the same annotation, it is said: 
"It appears to be well settled that if a liability 
policy expressly makes the insured's failure to 
give timely notice a ground of foref eiture, or 
compliance a condition precedent to liability, no 
recovery can be had where timely notice has not 
been given .... " 
and at page 480 in the same annotation, it is said: 
"The general rule to the effect that the insurer 
need not show that its rights had been prejudiced 
by the insured's delay in giving notice or in for-
warding the suit papers has been said to apply 
particularly in those cases in which the liability 
policy contained a provision making compliance 
-with the requirement as to notice in forwarding 
suit papers expressly a condition precedent to any 
liability on the part of the insurer.'' 
See also the previously cited case of Sohm v. U.S.F. & G. 
Com~pany, 352 F.2d 65: 
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" The inquiry into whether the appellee was 
prPjudiced hy the delav is irrelernnt 'for if the 
giving of not'ice was a ~ondition precedent to the 
right of recovery, the failure to give it pre\'entt>d 
any liability from attaching.' Phoenix Cotton Oil 
Co. vs. Royal Indemnity Co., supra." 
For other authorities to the same effect, see: Couch on 
I nsitrance 2nd, Sections 49 :50 and 49 :338; Hoffman vs. 
Employer's Liability Assitrance Corporation, (Ore.), 29 
P.2d 557 followed in the recent case of Bonney v. Jones, 
(Ore.), 439 P.2d 881; Sears, Roelmck & Company v. Hart-
ford Accident and Indemnity Company, CWash.), 313 
P.2d 347. \Ve also invite attention to a line of cases 
represented by A rtukovich vs. St. Paitl-M ercury Indem-
nity Company, (Cal.), 310 P.2d -1:61, and holding that 
prejudice is presumed from latt> notice. 
Even if this court were to elect to follow the minor-
ity view, the present record discloses that defendant 
has been prejudiced in the following particulars: 
1. That it has not even been able to determine from 
its own records whether it ever issued a policy to the 
plaintiff, its records that far back having been destroyed. 
See Amitndson vs. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident 
Association, 13 Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463. 
2. Defendant lost the opportunity to obtain infor-
mation concerning the facts of the matter from the plain-
tiff while the facts of the matter were still fresh in his 
mind and to preserve said facts by appropriate narra-
tive :o:tatPments or dPpositions. 
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3. It lost the opportunity to obtain an independent 
medical evaluation of the plaintiff and to determine at 
an early state in the proceedings whether this was a 
proper claim of liability. 
4. It lost the opportunity to negotiate directly with 
the plaintiff for settlement of her claim on personal 
injury values as they existed in the 1950s, rather than 
on today's inflationary values, and it also lost the oppor-
tunity to attempt to negotiate a settlement without the 
intervention of an attorney and the expense of litiga-
tion. The very purposes of the notice requirement as 
set forth in appellant's brief sufficiently identify the 
prejudice which defendant has sustained by reason of 
the late notice in this case. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE CLEAR AND 
UNEQUIVOCAL PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY OF 
INSURANCE. 
In his desperation to find a tenable theory upon 
which he might prevail, plaintiff has argued to this 
court the adoption of a strange new breed of law called 
"Adhesion Contracts." This contention is based solely 
upon a single case from the State of California, unsup-
ported by any other judicial authority and in violent 
conflict with well established contract and insurance 
law, both in this state and generally. The general rule 
for the construction of an insurance contract is as set 
forth in 43 Am.Jur.2d, pages 318 and 319, Insurance, 
Section 260, as follows: 
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nal principle pertaining to the construction and 
interpretation of insurance contracts is that the 
intention of the parties should control. If the 
intention of the parties can be clearly discovered, 
the court will give effect to that intention within 
the sphere of its proper and legal operation and 
will construe accordingly the terms used in the 
policy, no matter how inapt, ungrammatical, or 
inaccurate they may appear when viewed strictly 
or legally. The rule is that once the intention of 
the parties is clearly ascertained, a policy of 
insurance is to be liberally construed in order to 
carry out that intention, especially where a liberal 
construction is the reasonable one and a literal 
construction would lead to manifest injustice. 
However, if not ambiguous or uncertain, the 
express terms and language the parties have used 
should be given effect and their intention must 
be derived from the language employed. If the 
intention of the parties is clear, the courts have 
no authority to change the contract in any par-
ticular; they cam construe but not make contracts 
of insiirance for the parties, and they cannot 
disregard the express language the parties have 
used when such language is capable of reasonable 
interpretation." (Emphasis ours.) 
The case of Gray v. Zurich Insitrance Company, upon 
which plaintiff relies, is a relatively simple case, stand-
ing for a simple proposition. In the Court of Appeals it 
was held as follows: 
"The obligation of the insurer to defend an action 
brought against the insured is determined by 
reference to (1) the terms of the insurance policy, 
and (2) the language of the complaint in the 
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action brought against the insured." Gray vs. 
Zurich Insurance Company, 49 Cal. Reptr. 271. 
This holding was based upon the earlier decision of 
Lamb vs. Belt Casitalty Cornpany, 40 P.2d 311. It is in 
accord with generally accepted insurance law. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of California reversed. The essential 
holding of the Court on appeal is as set forth in the 
following quotation: 
"Since modern procedural rules focus on the facts 
of a case rather than the theory of recovery in 
the complaint, the duty to def end should be fixed 
by the facts which the insurer learns from the 
complaint, the insured, or other sources. An in-
surer, therefore, bears a duty to defend its 
insured whenever it ascertains facts which give 
rise to the potential of liability under the policy. 
In the instant case the complaint itself, as well as 
the facts known to the insurer, sufficiently 
apprised the insurer of these possibilities; hence 
we need not set out when and upon what other 
occasions the duty of the insurer to ascertain 
such possibilities otherwise arises." 419 P.2d 168, 
177. 
This represents an extension of the earlier rule, which 
has found favor in some courts. Under this view, the 
insurer has a duty to defend, not only if the allegations 
of the complaint are within the coverage of the policy, 
but also if the insurer has information which might bring 
the accident or incident within the coverage of the policy. 
All that is said in the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Gray vs. Zitrich Insitrance Company about adhesion 
contracts is sheer dictum. It will be noted from an 
examination of the opinion that the author has indulged 
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himself in a considerable amount of ivory tower think-
ing, and that his views are supported only by the ivory 
tower thinking of prof es so rs as represented in Law Re-
view articles, but not by the judicial thinking of any 
other court of this country. 
Plaintiff cites not a single other case or text to 
support this doctrine. Our research has failed to dis-
cover any other case which would support it, nor do we 
find it discussed in any of the standard texts, either on 
contract law or on insurance law. The purported doc-
trine has no place in our law, and certainly) even if it 
is recognized to exist, would have no application here. 
The policy provisions here involved are standard forms 
and have been in common use for decades. They are 
clear and unequivocal, and their meaning is well known 
and understood throughout the industry. The provisions 
have been construed by many courts and have never 
been found to be ambiguous nor susceptible of construc-
tion. 
It may be further observed that as a protection 
to the insurance buying public, all insurance policy forms 
are subject to the scrutiny and approval of the Insur-
ance Commissioner of this state before they may be 
used. Section 31-19-9, U.C.A. 1953. 
Nor can the plain language of the policy be dis-
regarded out of sheer sympathy for the injured victim. 
The better rule is as set forth in the case of Bonney 
vs. Jones, et al., (Ore.), 439 P.2d 881, at 882: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
""While there is a diversity of legal opinion upon 
the strictness with which the notice provisions 
of insurance contracts should be enforced in 
actions by tort victims against insurance carriers, 
Oregon has followed the rule that the rights of 
the tort victim against the insurance carrier are 
generally no greater than the rights of the in-
sured .... " 
POINT V 
THE CASE IS RIPE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The general rule is set forth in 6 Moore's Federal 
Practice, Section 56.04, p. 2028, as follows: 
"The summary judgment procedure prescribed in 
Rule 56 is a procedural device for promptly dis-
posing of actions in which there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact. In many cases 
there is no genuine issue of fact, although such 
an issue is raised by the formal pleadings. The 
purpose of Rule 56 is to eliminate a trial in such 
cases, since a trial is unnecessary and results in 
delay and expense which may operate to defeat 
in whole or in part the recovery of a just claim 
or the expeditious termination of an action be-
cause of a meritorious defense that is factually 
indisputable. 'The very object of a motion for 
summary judgment is to separate what is formal 
or pretended in denial or averment from what is 
genuine and substantial, so that only the latter, 
may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial.' 
"To attain this end, the rule permits a party to 
pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings and 
to obtain relief by summary judgment where facts 
set forth in detail in affidavits, depositions, and 
admissions on file show there are no genuine 
issues of material fact to be tried." 
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This court, in the case of Henry vs. W ashiki Club 
Incorporated, 11 Utah 2d 138, 355 P.2d 973, said: 
"We recognize the validity of the plaintiff's argu-
ment that doubts should be resolved in favor of 
permitting one who has a grievance to present his 
claim to a court or jury, and that a summary 
judgment, which deprives him of that privilege, 
should be granted with reluctance. However, it 
does have a useful and salutary purpose. When 
the evidence as contended by the plaintiff, and 
every reasonable inference that fairly could be 
drawn therefrom, are considered in the light most 
favorable to him, and it nevertheless appears that 
he could establish no right to recovery, the mo-
tion should be granted to save the time, trouble 
and expense involved in a trial." (Emphasis ours.) 
To the same effect is the language of this court in 
Raymond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 113 Utah 
26, 191 P.2d 137. Although that case involved a non-
suit rather than a motion for sununary judgment, the 
following language would appear to be equally applicable 
here: 
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff that 
this decision has deprived him of his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. That contention has 
been urged upon this court in almost every case 
of nonsuit and directed verdict brought before us. 
This court is charged with the duty of protecting 
all of the rights of all litigants. This is especially 
true of those fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the State and Federal Constitutions. But the 
right to have a jury pass 'upon issues of fact does 
not incl1tde the right to have a caitse submitted to 
a jitry in the hope of a verdict where the facts 
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undisputably show that the plaintiff is not en--
titled to relief." (Emphasis ours.) 
To like effect are Matievitch v. Hercitles Powder Co., 
3 Utah 2d 283, 282 P.2d 1044, and Abdulkadir v. Western 
Pacific R. Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339. 
Plaintiff contends that there are three issues of 
fact remaining to be determined as follows: 
1. A factual question as to whether plaintiff gave 
timely notice iinder the policy. There is no dispute on 
this issue. Plaintiff's own testimony was that he did 
not give notice to the defendant until June of 1967, after 
he had received a demand letter from his patient's attor-
ney. The evidence also shows without dispute and from 
plaintiff's own office records, that he had knowledge 
more than ten years earlier that his patient was exper-
iencing severe and unanticipated results from the treat-
ment and that these would ultimately result in serious 
injury, including the loss of a jawbone and many teeth. 
Plaintiff's own office records further establish that 
plaintiff was aware that his patient may have received 
an excessive dosage of x-ray, either by reason of a cumu-
lative effect from prior radio-therapy or by reason of 
his own miscalculation cf the proper dosage. The order 
granting summary judgment was based solely upon the 
plaintiff's own version of the matter, as established on 
his deposition and by his own office records. He has 
made no effort to rebut, dispute or explain them. 
2. Plaintiff contends that there is a question as to 
whether notice would lJe exci1sed itnder the circimistances 
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of this case. Under the facts of this case, that is not an 
issue of fact but an issue of law. It is fully discussed 
under our Point II of this brief. 
3. Plaintiff also contends that there is an issue of 
fact as to whether defendant has been prejudiced by any 
late notice. Again, this is an issue of law and not a 
question of fact. It is fully discussed under our Point 
III of this brief. 
While we recognize that in most cases and under 
most circumstances, the question of whether the notice 
was reasonably given to satisfy the requirements of the 
policy is a question of fact, where the delay has been 
as great as it was here, the courts hold unanimously 
that as a matter of law the notice does not comply with 
the policy requirements. The rule is stated in Couch on 
Insurance Second, Section 49 :46, as follows: 
"Where the facts are clear, the question as to 
whether notice was reasonably given so as to 
satisfy the requirement of immediate notice is for 
the courts 1 or as declared in some cases, where 
the delay has been so great that the court may 
rule it a matter of law." 
Utah cases which have held to this effect are Amund-
son vs. Midual Benefit Health and Accident Association, 
13 Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463; Anderson vs. Beneficial 
Fire and Casitalty Company, 21 Utah 2d 173, 442 P.2d 
933; and Dimn vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, (Utah), 110 P.2d 561. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the plaintiff's own testimony and on his own 
office records, he utterly and completely failed to comply 
with the requirement of his alleged policy that notice 
be given as soon as reasonably practicable. He has 
offered no justification or excuse. As a matter of law, 
under the rules laid dmYn by this court in earlier deci-
sions, plaintiff is not entitled to prevail and the judg-
ment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
Ray R. Christensen 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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